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There is a vast amount of potential mappings between behaviors and intentions in
communication: a behavior can indicate a multitude of different intentions, and the same
intention can be communicated with a variety of behaviors. Humans routinely solve
these many-to-many referential problems when producing utterances for an Addressee.
This ability might rely on social cognitive skills, for instance, the ability to manipulate
unobservable summary variables to disambiguate ambiguous behavior of other agents
(“mentalizing”) and the drive to invest resources into changing and understanding the
mental state of other agents (“communicative motivation”). Alternatively, the ambiguities
of verbal communicative interactionsmight be solved by general-purpose cognitive abilities
that process cues that are incidentally associated with the communicative interaction.
In this study, we assess these possibilities by testing which cognitive traits account for
communicative success during a verbal referential task. Cognitive traits were assessed
with psychometric scores quantifying motivation, mentalizing abilities, and general-
purpose cognitive abilities, taxing abstract visuo-spatial abilities. Communicative abilities
of participants were assessed by using an on-line interactive task that required a speaker to
verbally convey a concept to an Addressee. The communicative success of the utterances
was quantiﬁed bymeasuring how frequently a number of Evaluators would infer the correct
concept. Speakers with highmotivational and general-purpose cognitive abilities generated
utterances that weremore easily interpreted.These ﬁndings extend to the domain of verbal
communication the notion that motivational and cognitive factors inﬂuence the human
ability to rapidly converge on shared communicative innovations.
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INTRODUCTION
Daily humancommunication is surprisingly effective, even though
it involves producing and understanding utterances that are inher-
ently ambiguous. The potential mapping between behavior and
intentions in communication is very large and many-to-many,
such that similar behaviors can indicate different intentions and
vice versa.
The ability of humans to map behavior to intentions has
been labeled interactive intelligence (Levinson, 2006) andmight be
supported bymotivational factors and cognitive abilities. The cog-
nitive abilities implicated in understanding the intentions, feelings
or thoughts of others, are often labeled as Theory of Mind ormen-
talizing abilities (Premack andWoodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004; Frith and Frith, 2012). Motivational factors
refer to the drive to invest resources to understand another individ-
ual, thewillingness andmotivation to spend energy understanding
the mental states of others (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2009). In
an alternative account, it is proposed that most of the time inter-
locutors would not have to infer the mental state of the other’s
mind at all. Automatic alignment of representations of the other’s
message-meaning mapping by tight coupling of production and
comprehension (Pickering and Garrod, 2004) or the many cues
generated during interaction (Shintel and Keysar, 2009) would
sufﬁce. Under most circumstances, no speciﬁc mentalizing skills
would be needed to solve the many-to-many mapping problem.
In this perspective, communicative coordination relies on general-
purpose cognitive abilities, as if communication would be similar
to complex problem solving. The latter account gets credibility
from the ﬁnding that, considering the speed of human communi-
cation,mentalizing as the only strategy to solve themulti-mapping
problem is implausible as it would require extensive cognitive and
temporal resources (Shintel and Keysar, 2009; Lin et al., 2010).
Here, we test whether motivational factors, mentalizing abil-
ities, or general cognitive abilities in speakers predict successful
tailoring of a message in a verbal communication game. For
instance, an agent might have extremely sophisticated computa-
tional abilities andbe able to store/retrieve a very large set of behav-
ior/meaning mappings, but fail to do anything if not motivated to
communicate, or fail to adjust a sophisticated behavior/meaning
mapping to an Addressee and make it comprehensible. Different
cognitive abilities involved in human communication might be
differently sensitive to the expression of psychological traits across
a group of individuals (Baron-Cohen et al., 2005; De Ruiter et al.,
2010). Individual variation can help us understand the general
principles of human communication (Levinson and Gray, 2012).
In this study we investigate which psychometric scores indexing
motivational factors and cognitive abilities, contribute most to a
Communicator’s success.
Previous research investigated individual sources of variation
in subject pairs engaged in a non-verbal communication game
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(Volman et al., 2012). The design in that study focussed on how
pairs of Communicators establish communicative strategies, and
how inter-subject differences inﬂuence communicative success.
Communicators’ motivation to solve complex tasks, as indexed
by the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo et al., 1996),
predicted communicative success. General intelligence of the
Addressees, as indexed by the Raven’s advanced progressive matri-
ces (RAPM; Raven et al., 1995) accounted for higher accuracy
scores. Although attribution of mental states to another person
(mentalizing) seems an important capacity for creating a new
communication system that both Communicator and Addressee
can comprehend, the speed and success with which such a new
communicative system was established could not be explained
by the participants’ score on the empathy quotient (EQ; Baron-
Cohen andWheelwright, 2004), or a similar measure for empathy,
the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI; Davis, 1983). In a related
study using the same non-verbal communication game, the mag-
nitude of communicative adjustments to a presumed Addressee
was explained by the EQ (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009). Senders
high in empathy put greater emphasis on crucial communicative
elements when they believed their Addressee was a child compared
to when they believed their Addressee was an adult. In contrast,
individuals with high motivation for complex problems (NCS;
Cacioppo et al., 1996)were less likely to adapt their communicative
behavior toward their Addressee.
The picture that emerges from those studies on non-verbal
communication systems is that empathic traits may be beneﬁ-
cial for adapting communicative behavior to another individual.
In contrast, the ability to generate effective communicative acts
might be mainly inﬂuenced by the motivation and ability to solve
complex problems.
Here, we tested the role of trait variables on the ability
to generate successful communicative interaction in the ver-
bal domain by indexing individual differences in empathiz-
ing (IRI and EQ, respectively Davis, 1983; Baron-Cohen and
Wheelwright, 2004) Need for Cognition Scale (NCS, Cacioppo
et al., 1984), general intelligence (RAPM, Raven et al., 1995)
and verbal intelligence (Groninger Intelligentie Test Matrix
Reasoning, and the Wexler Adult Intelligence Scale Simi-
larity and Vocabulary subscale, respectively Kooreman and
Luteijn, 1987; WAIS-III, 1997). Abstract visuo-spatial abilities
were indexed as part of the RAPM (Carpenter et al., 1990;
Mackintosh andBennett, 2005).Wewill examine how these factors
in the Communicator contribute to successful communication,
that is, generating an accurate and easy interpretable message for
an Addressee (see Ickes et al., 2000 on the role of motivation on
empathic accuracy in observators) in the context of an interactive
word game.
In the interactive word game, both communicative setting and
linguistic difﬁculty were independently manipulated. We used a
paradigm called the Taboo game (Willems et al., 2010) where a
Communicator had to describe a Target-word (e.g., “Beard”) to
an Addressee in one sentence without using Taboo-words (e.g.,
“man,” “shave,” “hair,” “chin” and “mostache”; see Figure 1A). An
indicationof theTarget-worddescription’s communicative success
was obtained by evaluation of these utterances by a new group of
subjects (labeled as Evaluators, see Figure 1B). The data reported
in this manuscript relates the performance of these Evaluators to
the psychometric scores of Communicators. We predict to ﬁnd a
similar pattern as described above: not mentalizing abilities per
se, but the motivation or general cognitive ability to solve com-
plex tasks will account for effective communication in an existing
verbal communication system. This study aims to open the way
for understanding variations in visual perspective-taking abilities
during social interactions. Accordingly, we pay particular atten-
tion to the RAPM as an index of visuo-spatial abilities (Carpenter
et al., 1990; Mackintosh and Bennett, 2005).
MATERIAL AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Sixteen participants (labeled as Communicators, fourmales,mean
age = 21 years old, SD = 3 years) played the Taboo game in the
context of an fMRI experiment (for further details, see Willems
et al., 2010) and completed several psychometric tests. All had
Dutch as their mother-tongue, and did not have a known neu-
rological history, hearing problems, dyslexia, stuttering or other
language-related problems. In a separate experimental session, six-
teen subjects naive to the Taboo game evaluated the Target-word
descriptions generated by the Communicators. These Evaluators
(four males, mean age = 20 years old, SD = 3 years) did not
have language, hearing or eyesight difﬁculties and had Dutch as
their mother tongue. The data reported in this manuscript relates
the performance of the Evaluators to the psychometric scores of
Communicators.
PROCEDURE
Description from Communicators
Experimental material was obtained in the context of an fMRI
study (for further details, see Willems et al., 2010). Communi-
cators generated descriptions for a confederate (referred to as
Addressee) after which we obtained their psychometric scores on
various cognitive abilities and motivational factors (for details of
the acquisition of the Communicators’ psychometric scores, see
Psychometric indexes of individual cognitive abilities of Commu-
nicators). In a separate study, a group of new participants labeled
as Evaluators rated these descriptions’ communicative success.
Communicators made descriptions of 60 concrete nouns
(Target-words). They would for instance have to describe
the Target-word “beard” without using ﬁve so called Taboo-
words “hair,” “chin,” “man,” “shave” and “mustache” (see
Figure 1A). Communicator and Addressee could clearly hear
each other’s utterances via MR (Magnetic Resonance) compat-
ible headphones, with the Addressee inferring the Target-word
that the Communicator described. Since the Communicator
was lying in the MR scanner, we ﬁltered out scanner noise
using the audacity noise reduction function (Audacity from
http://audacity.sourceforge.net/) to increase the audibility of the
Target-word descriptions. Descriptions lasted on average 5.14 s
(SD = 0.68 s). In the Taboo game, two factors were manipulated:
communicative setting and linguistic difﬁculty. Communicative
setting was manipulated by changing the Communicator’s belief
of the Addressee’s knowledge of the Target-word. In the TAR-
GETED setting the Communicator generated the description for
a speciﬁc other (a confederate), who gave wrong answers on a
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Time line of the Taboo game. In an fMRI experiment
Communicators had to describe a Target-word (“beard”) to an Addressee
(confederate) without using Taboo-words (“hair,” “chin,” “man,” “shave”
and “mostache”). In the TARGETED setting (depicted in red), Communicators
were made to believe that the Addressee was unbeknownst of the
Target-word (right empty box next to the Target-word “beard”). In the
NON-TARGETED setting (depicted in blue), Communicators were aware that
the Addressee already knew the Target-word. Communicators were
reminded of this by printing the Target-word twice on the Communicator’s
screen. (B) Obtaining indications of communicative success (in green).
First, Evaluators, naive of the Taboo game experiment, listened to the
Target-word description made during the Taboo game. Second, Evaluators
were asked to consider which Target-word they thought was described.
Third, they were to type in their answer (Guess-word) and lastly, they ﬁlled
out how difﬁcult they found it to come up with their answer on a scale
from one till ﬁve (1 “easy,” 5 “difﬁcult”; certainty scores). A measure of
Communicators’ success was obtained by counting the Evaluators’ correct
guesses divided by the total amount of trials per condition.
prescribed set of trials (30% of the trials). In case of a wrong
trial, Communicators were asked to generate a new Target-
word description consecutively. These repeated trials were not
rated by the Evaluators. In the NON-TARGETED setting, it was
explained to Communicators that theAddressee was already aware
of the Target-word and that this person was only overhearing the
Communicator’s Target-word description. Communicators were
reminded that the Addressee already knew the Target-word by
printing the Target-word twice on the Communicator’s screen
(see Figure 1A). Linguistic difﬁculty was manipulated by varying
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the semantic distance between Target-word and Taboo-words.
During EASY trials, Communicators described Target-words with-
out using Taboo-words that were loosely semantically related
to the Target-word (e.g., Target-word “rainbow,” Taboo-words:
“four-leaf-clover,” “violet,” “water,” “sound,” “fairy-tale”). During
DIFFICULT trials, Communicators described Target-words without
using Taboo-words that were closely semantically related to the
Target-word (such as the “beard” example above).
During the TARGETED and the NON-TARGETED setting, half of
the trials were EASY, and half of the trials were DIFFICULT. Lex-
ical frequency of Taboo and Target-words was matched between
all conditions (CELEX database, Baayen et al., 1995). Stimulus lists
were pseudo-randomized in two sets such that participants did not
describe the same Target-words in TARGETED and NON-TARGETED
trials. Half of the Communicators described Target-words of
set A in the TARGETED setting and Target-words of set B in the
NON-TARGETED setting. The other half of the Communicators
described Target-words in the opposite settings, meaning set B in
the TARGETED setting and set A in the NON-TARGETED setting. More
Communicators completed Set A during the TARGETED setting. To
prevent Evaluators from hearing certain Target-word descriptions
more often generated in the TARGETED or the NON-TARGETED set-
ting, four out of the twenty Communicators of the original Taboo
game experiment were excluded at random. With sixty Target-
word descriptions of sixteen Communicators; there were a total of
960 unique Target-word descriptions.
Evaluators
In the current experiment, a new group of subjects evaluated these
Target-word descriptions from the Willems et al. (2010) study to
obtain an indication of the Communicator’s communicative suc-
cess. After reading a written instruction, Evaluators completed
three practice trials not used in the remainder of the experiment,
and then performed the actual task in two blocks of approximately
thirty minutes each. Trials were separated in different phases (see
Figure 1B). At ﬁrst, a black screenwas presented inwhich aﬁxation
cross appeared. The Evaluators heard a Target-word description
made by one of the Communicators, e.g.,“Something on your face
that goes from ear to ear.” Evaluators planned their response with
a cut-off time of twenty seconds and typed which Target-word
they thought was described (Guess-word). Thereafter, Evalua-
tors were asked to give a score from one to ﬁve on how difﬁcult
they found it to generate their answer with “1”meaning that they
found this very difﬁcult and “5” meaning that they found this
very easy (from now on referred to as “certainty score”). After a
randomized intertrial interval (mean = 4.5 s, SD = 0.93 s), the
next trial was presented. The experiment was performed using
Presentation software (Version 10.2, www.neurobs.com) and pre-
sented on a laptop computer via earphones. Stimulus presentation
was pseudo-randomized such that each Communicator’s Target-
word description was rated by two different Evaluators. In total,
each Evaluator heard a total of 120 unique Target-word descrip-
tions, eight from the same Communicator: two recorded during
the TARGETED EASY condition, two recorded during the TARGETED
DIFFICULT condition, two during the NON-TARGETED EASY and two
during the NON-TARGETED DIFFICULT condition. Descriptions of
the same Communicator or the same Target-word would never
be presented in immediate succession; neither would Evaluators
hear a description of a particular Target-word more than once per
block. For instance, in the ﬁrst block, Evaluators would hear a
recording of a Target-word description of “beard” by Communi-
cator A, and in the second block they would hear a recording of a
Target-word description of “beard” by Communicator B.
Psychometric indexes of individual cognitive abilities of
Communicators
After playing the Taboo game, each Communicator completed
psychometric tests to characterize their empathizing abilities (IRI
and EQ, respectively Davis, 1983; Baron-Cohen andWheelwright,
2004), motivation for complex tasks (NCS, Cacioppo et al., 1984),
general intelligence (RAPM, Raven et al., 1995) and verbal intel-
ligence (GIT matrices, WAIS Similarity and WAIS Vocabulary
subscale, respectively Kooreman and Luteijn, 1987; WAIS-III,
1997). Since the focus of our paper was on the Communicator, no
psychometric indexes of cognitive abilities or motivational factors
were taken from the Evaluators.
The EQ indexes both cognitive and affective empathy. It char-
acterizes cognitive empathy (mentalizing), reactivity and social
skill but is not correlated with social desirability (Baron-Cohen
and Wheelwright, 2004; Lawrence et al., 2004). Instead of calcu-
lating one scale, empathy can also be indexed in four subscales as
is done in the IRI (Davis, 1983). The Perspective Taking subscale
indexes the ease with which one can take the point of view or
perspective of the other. The Fantasy subscale indexes how easily
somebody can identify himself/herself with a ﬁctional character.
There are two subscales of emotional reactions: the EmpathicCon-
cern subscale indexes feelings of compassion and warmth, while
the Personal Distress subscale indexes the tendency to feel discom-
fort when observing another person in distress. Motivation to be
engaged in complex tasks, such as we assume the Taboo game is,
was indexed with the NCS (Cacioppo et al., 1984). The EQ, IRI
and NCS are self-report Likert scale type questionnaires. All three
questionnaires were completed with paper and pencil.
Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (Raven et al., 1995)
index general intelligence. Two separate factors underlie perfor-
mance on the RAPM. Part of the items are solved by verbal-
analytical rules, whereas other items tend to be solved using
visual-spatial rules (Carpenter et al., 1990; DeShon et al., 1995).
Communicators had to complete as many of the 36 items (RAPM
set II) as possible within twenty minutes. The Communicator’s
RAPM score was calculated by adding up the number of correctly
completed items within that time.
Communicators high in verbal intelligence may have a larger
vocabulary and, due to their increased word reasoning skills,
have easier access to alternatives for Taboo-words. The WAIS
Vocabulary subscale (WAIS-III, 1997) indexes word understand-
ing and how well this word understanding can be expressed.
Participants are asked to give deﬁnitions of words that become
increasingly more unfamiliar. Word reasoning skills were indexed
by theGroninger Intelligence TestMatrix Reasoning subscale (GIT
Matrix Reasoning, Kooreman and Luteijn, 1987). Participants are
asked to solve analogies, such as“if table is to wood, stove is to iron,
thus shoe is to. . .”During theWAIS Similarity subscale (WAIS-III,
1997), participants are asked to describe how common objects or
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concepts are similar, e.g.,“what is the similarity between a bike and
a car?” All the verbal intelligence subscales were taken orally and
scored according to prescribed standards (Kooreman and Luteijn,
1987; WAIS-III, 1997).
Communicative success
Our measure of communicative success was based on the correct
guesses of the Evaluators divided by the total amount of trials per
condition. In the following cases, we rated the Evaluators’ guesses
as correct: if theGuess-word had exactly the sameword form as the
Taboo word, if the Guess-word was a compound instead of a head,
or vice versa (for example “woonwijk” or “wijk” meaning “living
district” and “neighborhood”), if it was a synonym (“leunstoel”
by “fauteuil,” meaning “armchair” and “lounge chair”), or if it
was a diminutive (e.g., “munt” by “muntje” meaning “coin” and
“little coin”). In this manner, we were able to consider successful
communication of word meaning.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Accuracy and certainty scores of Evaluators were analyzed using
a 2 × 2 within subjects ANOVA with factors setting (TARGETED
and NON-TARGETED) and linguistic difﬁculty (EASY and DIFFICULT).
First, to assess which psychometric indexes explained variance
in description quality, we performed a regression analysis with
communicative success in the TARGETED setting as a dependent
variable. Second, to correct for the individual differences in general
performance on the Taboo game, a second analysis was con-
ducted comparing the TARGETED to the NON-TARGETED setting by
subtracting the communicative success scores obtained from the
TARGETED and the NON-TARGETED setting. Third, regression analy-
ses were conducted to investigate which cognitive traits explained
communicative success during our manipulation of linguistic dif-
ﬁculty (DIFFICULT, EASY and EASY subtracted from DIFFICULT). In
each regression analysis, the Communicators’ psychometric scores
on all tests were entered as independent regressors in a stepwise
fashion: a variation on the forward algorithm. Only those inde-
pendent factors whose contribution was unique and signiﬁcant
were entered in the model (p < 0.05), while at each subsequent
search step redundant factors were removed. Since questionnaires
indexing the same cognitive ability may potentially correlate, e.g.,
mentalizing ability was indexed by both the EQ and the IRI),
we considered whether predictors correlated strongly with one
another, but Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcients were <0.8 across
regressors. Only independent variables explaining unique vari-
ance are reported. All statistical analyses were conducted with IBM
SPSS Statistics for Windows (Version 19.0).
RESULTS
REACTION TIMES, CERTAINTY RATINGS AND ACCURACY SCORES
Evaluators on average took 2.5 s (SD = 0.5 s) to gener-
ate a Guess-word. Evaluators found the task rather difﬁcult
(mean certainty rating = 2.25, SD = 0.29, 1–5 scale). How-
ever, Evaluators comprehended the Communicators’ Target-
word descriptions well (mean percentage correct = 73%,
SD = 5%, minimum score 62% and maximum 83%). There
was no interaction in reaction times, certainty ratings, or
accuracy scores between communicative setting (TARGETED,
NON-TARGETED) and difﬁculty (EASY, DIFFICULT), neither was there
a main effect of setting (TARGETED, NON-TARGETED). Evaluators
planned shorter, were more certain and more accurate for Target-
word descriptions made in the EASY condition (for statistics see
Table 1).
COMMUNICATIVE SUCCESS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Only those regressors explaining a statistically signiﬁcant por-
tion of variance are described here (for statistics see Table 2).
Communicative success during the TARGETED setting was posi-
tively driven by the Communicators’ motivation to solve complex
tasks as indexed by the NCS (Table 2, see Figure 2A). No such
effect was observed during the NON-TARGETED trials. Indexes of
empathy (IRI, EQ) did not account signiﬁcantly for variance in
performance.
Table 1 | Repeated measures analysis of variance was applied on
reaction times, certainty ratings and accuracy scores of Evaluators
when listening toTarget-word descriptions made by Communicators
in an earlier conducted fMRI experiment.
F(df) MSe p
Reaction times
Communication <1 (1,15) 32.2 0.73
Linguistic difﬁculty 11.25 (1,15) 30.66 <0.01
Communication × linguistic difﬁculty 1.48 (1,15) 53.37 0.24
Certainty ratings
Communication 2.78 (1,15) 0.05 0.12
Linguistic difﬁculty 11.75 (1,15) 0.06 <0.01
Communication × linguistic difﬁculty 1.53 (1,15) 0.07 0.24
Accuracy
Communication <1 (1,15) 0.02 0.87
Linguistic difﬁculty 7.45 (1,15) 0 <0.05
Communication × linguistic difﬁculty <1 (1,15) 0.01 0.91
The model contained the factors communicative setting (descriptions that Eval-
uators listened to were made in the TARGETED or the NON-TARGETED setting) and
linguistic difﬁculty (descriptions were made in the EASY or DIFFICULT condition).
Evaluators planned shorter (F(1,15) = 11.25, p < 0.01), were more certain
(F(1,15) = 11.75, p < 0.01) and more accurate (F(1,15) = 7.45, p < 0.05) for
Target-word description made in the easy condition.
Table 2 | Overview of psychometric indexes significantly accounting
for communicative success in the different experimental conditions.
Experimental
condition
Psychometric index Beta F (df) R2 p
Targeted NCS 0.54 5.86 (1,14) 0.3 <0.05
Targeted - non-
targeted
Raven’s APM 0.56 6.43 (1,14) 0.32 <0.05
Difﬁcult WAIS vocabulary 0.65 9.98 (2,13) 0.61 <0.01
IRI personal distress 0.46
Easy NCS 0.55 8.4 (2,13) 0.56 <0.05
IRI personal distress 0.51
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FIGURE 2 | Communicative success as evaluated by a new group of
participants (in percentage correct) plotted against the psychometric
indexes of the Communicators. (A) Communicators’ scores on
motivation for complex tasks as indexed by the NCS (R2 = 0.3, p < 0.05,
regression line is solid, data points represented as dots) drive
communicative success in the communicative setting (TARGETED condition).
(B) Communicators’ scores on general intelligence as indexed by Raven’s
Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM, R2 = 0.32, p < 0.05, regression
line is solid, data points represented as closed dots) drive communicative
success in the TARGETED setting compared to the NON-TARGETED setting.
A positive difference score indicates that Communicators performed better
in the TARGETED setting, a negative score that Communicators performed
better in the NON-TARGETED setting. To correct for individual differences in
general performance on the Taboo game, a model to account for
communicative success during the targeted setting compared with the
NON-TARGETED setting was created. The difference in accuracy scores
between the two conditions was positively driven by the Communicator’s
general intelligence as indexed by the Raven’s APM. Neither the EQ, nor
any of the IRI subscales could account for the difference in success
across the communicative settings.
To correct for individual differences in general performance
on the Taboo game, a model to account for communicative
success during the TARGETED setting compared with the NON-
TARGETED setting was created. The difference in accuracy scores
between the two conditions was positively driven by the Com-
municator’s general intelligence as indexed by the Raven’s APM
(see Table 2, Figure 2B). Neither the EQ, nor any of the IRI
subscales could account for the difference in success across the
communicative settings.
Verbal abilities as indexed with the WAIS vocabulary subscale
positively accounted for communicative success during DIFFICULT
trials (collapsed across TARGETED and NON-TARGETED settings).
Furthermore, the Communicator’s score on the IRI personal dis-
tress subscale, which indexes the tendency to feel discomfort
when observing somebody else’s distress, was predictive of accu-
racy scores on DIFFICULT trials. For EASY trials, the same subscale
(IRI personal distress) and the Communicator’s NCS positively
accounted for communicative success. None of the psychometric
indexes explained variance of communicative success in DIFFICULT
compared to EASY trials.
DISCUSSION
We have employed inter-subject differences in trait parameters
and communicative performance to examine whether motiva-
tional factors, mentalizing skills, or general-purpose cognitive
abilities preferentially accounted for communicative success. In
an interactive verbal communication task, participants (Com-
municators) were asked to describe concepts without using a
number of semantically related words (Willems et al., 2010).
Successful communication was quantiﬁed by how frequently a
group of new participants (Evaluators) would infer the cor-
rect concept. We found that motivational factors, as indexed by
the Communicator’s motivation to solve complex tasks (NCS),
were positively driving successful communication in a commu-
nicative (“TARGETED”) setting. These ﬁndings extend previous
observations (Volman et al., 2012) to the domain of verbal com-
munication, to show the importance of motivational factors in
communicative behavior. Communicators high in need for cog-
nition may make more effort to select the message/meaning
mapping that is best comprehensible. They may be more ﬂexi-
ble in ﬁnding alternatives, if the solution they generated turned
out to be incomprehensible for their Addressee (Cacioppo et al.,
1984; Evans et al., 2003). However, need for cognition did not
explain variance in communicative success, when we directly
compared the TARGETED versus the NON-TARGETED settings. That
is, need for cognition was important in explaining performance
during the communicative (TARGETED) trials overall, but not
when directly comparing TARGETED versus NON-TARGETED tri-
als. Comparing TARGETED versus NON-TARGETED settings directly
revealed that communicative success was signiﬁcantly predicted
by Communicators’ general-purpose cognitive ability as indexed
by Raven’s APM (Raven et al., 1995). A Communicator’s high gen-
eral intelligence may be beneﬁcial for the generation of efﬁcient
messages in several ways. It may help storage of speaker history
(Horton and Gerrig, 2005; Shintel and Keysar, 2009; Galati and
Brennan, 2010), executive control (Ybarra andWinkielman,2012),
and working memory capacity (Lin et al., 2010). This idea ﬁts
with recent evidence showing tightly matched neural dynamics
in subjects solving communicative and rule-based solo problems
(Stolk et al., 2013).
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From our ﬁndings, we can only speculate as to whether Com-
municator’s success in this communication game is driven by
general cognitive abilities, or more speciﬁcally by visuo-spatial
abilities. Research on the underlying cognitive processes of the
RAPM has suggested that some of Raven’s matrices are solved
using a visuo-spatial strategy (Carpenter et al., 1990; DeShon
et al., 1995) for an alternative view see (Plaisted et al., 2011).
This abstract visuo-spatial ability may positively drive effective
search of alternatives for words that cannot be used to gener-
ate the Target-word description (Taboo-words). Communicators
with a high RAPM score may be more skilful in ﬁnding words
that can be easily interpreted by the Addressee, and as a con-
sequence, be more effective in solving the message-to-meaning
problem.
Given that the communication task used in this study relied
on verbal material, it might appear surprising that the psychome-
tric indexes of verbal ability (GIT or WAIS subscales, Kooreman
and Luteijn, 1987; WAIS-III, 1997) did not signiﬁcantly account
for variation in communicative success. Yet, the verbal intelli-
gence of the Communicator (WAIS) was important for solving
trials where the Taboo-words were closely semantically related to
the Target-word (DIFFICULT trials). This may be an indication that
linguistic abilities accounted for communicative success in seman-
tically difﬁcult trials in general, but not for communicative trials
speciﬁcally. These ﬁndings support the notion of a cognitive dif-
ference between linguistic and communicative abilities (Willems
and Varley, 2010; Willems et al., 2011).
Importantly, mentalizing abilities, as indexed by general cog-
nitive empathy, emotional reactivity, social skill (EQ, Lawrence
et al., 2004) or as indexed by the Perspective Taking, Fantasy,
Empathic Concern and Personal Distress subscales (IRI; Davis,
1983), were also not signiﬁcantly related to communicative success
as a function of the communicative setting. Yet, a Communi-
cator’s personal distress was important for solving trials where
Taboo-words were closely semantically related to the Target-word
(DIFFICULT trials). This result is not immediately compatible with
the idea that mentalizing abilities are important for generating
a comprehensible message. However, this does not preclude the
possibility that mentalizing abilities are important for imple-
menting communicative adjustments toward a speciﬁc Addressee,
as previously shown in the context of non-verbal communica-
tion (Newman-Norlund et al., 2009). Nor does it preclude that
mentalizing abilities are employed in communicative task set-
tings. As a matter of fact, the fMRI data of the study from
which our materials were taken, shows that participants activate
mentalizing related brain areas when designing a communicative
message for a speciﬁc other (Willems et al., 2010). The present
ﬁndings add to this that the individual differences in mentaliz-
ing abilities are not indicative of communicative success, but
this obviously does not mean that such abilities are not used in
communication.
The current study is a ﬁrst step in the direction to point out
the role of motivational factors and cognitive abilities on ver-
bal communicative success. Given that the main experiment was
performed in an MR environment, the interaction was quite
rigidly structured and, as a consequence, not all constituents
of social interaction (De Jaegher et al., 2010; Schilbach et al.,
2012) were present during the game. For instance, the role of
Communicator and Addressee was ﬁxed, and there was a maxi-
mum duration of the time interval during which Communicator
and Addressee were allowed to speak. Our task was interactive
in the sense that Communicators were actively engaged in our
verbal interaction game. Interlocutors’ performance depended on
the clarity of the description of the Communicator and the com-
prehension of the Addressee. The interlocutors could to some
extent monitor and adjust their behavior on the basis of feed-
back (correct or incorrect), and on the timing of the on-line
interaction (e.g., time interval required by a Communicator to
organize an utterance, and by an Addressee to reply). In this
study, we focussed on the role of the Communicator. Future
research should study the effect of cognitive abilities and moti-
vational factors on both interlocutors and should investigate
additional factors that could be of inﬂuence on communica-
tive success, such as the role of motivation to engage in social
interaction or the extent of the pre-existing common ground
(e.g., strangers or close friends). Not only should these fac-
tors be studied at the individual level, but also on the “second
person” level, the level that comes about between interactors
(Becchio et al., 2010; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Schilbach et al.,
2012).
More generally, our data speak to the observation that if a Com-
municator has a global idea of her Addressee, she may not always
need to employ mentalizing abilities immediately or exclusively
(Shintel and Keysar, 2009). As Zaki and Ochsner (2012) put it, in
communication it is not either mentalizing, or general cognitive
abilities, but more a question of “when/how” the one system is
used and when/how the other system is used.
CONCLUSION
We have employed individual variation to examine whether
motivational factors, mentalizing skills, or general cognitive abil-
ities preferentially accounted for communicative success. We
found that motivational factors (“need for cognition”) and
general-purpose cognitive abilities (Raven’s matrices) were pos-
itively driving successful communication in an interactive com-
munication task. These ﬁndings extend previous observations
(Volman et al., 2012) to the domain of verbal communica-
tion and stress the importance of motivation and general-
purpose cognitive abilities in communicative success. Mental-
izing or empathy scores did not explain communicative suc-
cess in the paradigm that we employed here. Future research
should be directed toward understanding under which cir-
cumstances communicative behavior is most driven by moti-
vational and general cognitive factors, and when differences
in mentalizing abilities between individuals do make a differ-
ence.
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